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SWITZERLAND: HAS NEUTRALITY 
REACHED ITS LIMITS? 
Amy C. Di Stasio 
Switzerland ... a success story wants to be cherished-
even more so when it is about to reach its limits. 
Introduction 
No one would disagree with the statement 
that the history of Switzerland is, indeed, a his-
tory of success. In 1938 the New York Times 
described this tiny nation as "an island of lib-
erty and harmony in a sea of dictatorships and 
discord" and "a citadel of peace through stormy 
centuries." (Olson, p. 12) The history of 
Switzerland can be viewed as an historical con-
tradiction in comparison to the rest of Europe. 
It has successfully remained peaceful through 
centuries of world turmoil, translating this into 
the kind of prosperous society that warranted 
first place recognition in the Economist's 1993 
quality of life survey. 
Switzerland is an anomaly that challenges 
definition. Though it lacks a common culture, 
language, and religion, it is, notwithstanding, 
a unified nation. Achieving unification has 
been a long and tenuous struggle, a testimony 
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- Chenaux-Repond, p. 42 
to the strength and determination of human 
will. Gonzague De Reynold vividly describes the 
birth pangs of Swiss development: 
In order to form itself, this people 
had to struggle not only against pow-
erful enemies and conquer them; not 
only against a hard natural environ-
ment. . . but also, and above all , 
against itself. Composed of races 
that are different and even opposed 
carrying in its flesh ... relentless 
antagonisms, speaking four lan-
guages, having undergone the fear-
ful and exhausting fever of civil dis-
cords, having lost since the 
Reformation its religious unity, it 
includes all possible causes of divi-
sion. And, nevertheless, in spite of 
everything, it possesses an incon-
testable unity ... (De Reynold, p. 3) 
Switzerland's struggle for unity has been 
two-fold: internally, she has worked to achieve 
the peaceful cohabitation of culturally diverse 
communities. In addition, this internal strug-
gle for unification was compounded by the exter-
nal problems presented by Switzerland's geog-
raphy. Because of its central location in Western 
Europe and its passage routes through the Alps 
which served to link French and German lands 
with the Italian peninsula, Switzerland was cov-
eted by surrounding powers. Swiss history, 
played out on the battlefields of Alpine Europe, 
was the saga of a people struggling to prevent 
control by a foreign aggressor. Achieving and 
maintaining internal unity necessitated non-
involvement in the affairs of surrounding 
nations, hence the birth of Swiss neutrality. 
Swiss neutrality was never intended to 
imply pacifism; it was instead armed eternal 
neutrality. Defined as the nonparticipation of 
a state in an armed conflict among other states, 
Swiss neutrality implies that Switzerland is 
committed never to take part in any conflict 
that may arise, and is ready to enforce militar-
ily its independence and neutral status. This 
concept of neutrality found its roots in 
European history. As explained by Stephen 
Halbrook, "Neutrality is the best way to enforce 
sufficient protection of a small country's inde-
pendence and security." (Halbrook, p. 8) 
The circumstances leading to the adoption 
of neutrality by Switzerland find their basis in 
a history of political turmoil. While neutrality 
was favored by Swiss geography, it was truly 
born out of a desire for long-term peace and 
security. As Rene Schwok states, "Historically, 
in a confederation divided into several religions, 
languages, and cultures, subject to diverse 
interests, neutrality has prevented divisions that 
could serve to disrupt a country 's unity. " 
(Schwok, p. 78) By refusing to intervene in the 
disagreements of foreign nations, the Swiss 
have maintained stability, peace and unity 
among their diversified population. Having 
survived a history of internal tension and exter-
nal military intervention by surrounding 
nations, it is understandable that the Swiss fear 
their neighbors becoming too close. Accepting 
any form of political authority from an outside 
source is difficult, considering the hard-fought 
battle to achieve unity. 
Chenaux-Repond describes Swiss history 
in this way: "The history of Switzerland is one 
of defense, reaction and fencing itself off- that 
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is positioning itself as an antithesis to what was 
occurring in the rest of Europe." (Chenaux-
Repond, p. 42) Swiss neutrality grew directly, 
in part, out of the political situation that exist-
ed on the European continent. Neutrality, then, 
was not an end in itself; rather, it was simply 
the means to an end, the final objective being 
internal stability and peace. However, at the 
end of the 20th century, the forces and factors 
that gave rise to Swiss neutrality no longer 
exist. Switzerland has achieved and managed 
to maintain an extraordinary degree of internal 
peace. More importantly, the European conti-
nent is markedly altered, and Switzerland no 
longer finds itself as a strategic center of com-
munication and conflict. Therefore, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that the need for neu-
trality is no longer valid; yet, neutrality persists. 
While neutrality is deeply imbedded in the 
fiber of Swiss history, it is not now and never 
has been validated by constitutional law. 
Rather, Switzerland's neutrality has been flexi-
ble in nature- a concept defined and redefined 
in order to best serve its purpose with regard to 
its impact on foreign policy. To a great extent, 
it has served as a convenient tool, allowing 
Switzerland to carefully choose its degree of 
involvement in world affairs. However, as the 
European community continues to move clos-
er to unified cooperation, Switzerland "runs the 
risk of standing in its own way" (Chenaux-
Repond, p. 45) by continuing a strict adherence 
to its policy of neutrality. Herein lies the Swiss 
dilemma; while neutrality has served 
Switzerland well, perhaps it has reached the 
limits of its usefulness. 
Historical Basis for Neutrality 
Throughout history the policy of neutral-
ity as a tool of foreign policy has received its 
share of both praise and scorn. Critics of the 
policy argue against the concept on political, 
moral and emotional levels. Politically, the 
argument exists that Swiss neutrality is inher-
ently negative and lacking in positive values -
an admission of political weakness rather than 
a show of strength. As Luck states, "The do-
nothing neutrality of the Swiss is ridiculous; it 
was a state of nullity rather than neutrality, a 
form of political sleeping sickness. " (Luck, 
p. 335) Neutrality is blamed for converting 
Switzerland into a maid, existing only to serve 
foreign powers. Adherence to neutrality has 
also resulted in accusations of immorality. 
Again, according to Luck: 
A free and independent people should 
be ashamed to hide under a cloak of 
neutrality when people in neighbor-
ing States seek to rise against their 
oppressors; the Swiss should join, in 
the name of elementary justice and 
human rights, in overthrowing 
rulers who exploit and victimize their 
people. (Luck, p. 37 4) 
In the face of criticism, neutrality persists 
because it has ultimately proven successful in 
accomplishing Switzerland's goal of internal 
peace and harmony. To completely understand 
this nation's loyalty to an undoubtedly contro-
versial policy, however, it is necessary to review 
Swiss history - a history of complex events 
that provide the reasons for this nation's loyal-
ty to the concept of neutrality. 
The Swiss Confederation was formally 
established on August 1, 1291, when leaders of 
the three Alpine provinces of Uri, Schwyz, and 
Unterwalden successfully defended their demo-
cratically governed communities (cantons) 
against the intrusions of the Hapsburgs. They 
referred to themselves as Eidgenossen -
Companions of the Oath- and pledged mutu-
al assistance against all enemies who threatened 
their independence. Their alliance marked the 
beginning of the nation of Switzerland. During 
the years of the 14th century, the three origi-
nal cantons expanded to include Lucerne 
Zurich, Glarus, Zug and Bern, comprising 
much of what is now central and northern 
Switzerland. While the threats to Swiss inde-
pendence continued, common hostility to the 
Hapsburgs proved strong enough to override 
the diversities that strained the young confed-
eration. By 1394, after suffering decisive mili-
tary defeats at the Battles of Laupen, Sempach, 
and Nafels, the Hapsburgs could no longer 
maintain their dominance over the cantons. 
At the beginning of the 15th century, the 
struggle for freedom from external domination 
continued, as the eight cantons found them-
selves surrounded by the powerful dynasties of 
Hapsburg, Milan, Savoy and Burgundy. In the 
Burgundian War in 1476, Switzerland defeated 
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the most powerful army in Europe, led by 
Charles the Bold. The victory gained recogni-
tion for the Swiss army. It was increasingly evi-
dent that, because of Switzerland's coveted loca-
tion, maintaining independence would be an 
ongoing battle. In 1481 at the Diet of Stans 
the tiny Swiss Confederation adopted the advic~ 
of a politically astute Swiss monk, Brother 
Klaus, who proposed that Switzerland choose 
to remain neutral during all foreign conflicts. 
As Klaus stated, "Neutrality would deny poten-
tial aggressors a casus belli, a reason for war, 
and would thus serve to deter foreign aggres-
sion." (Halbrook, p. 7) Though it would be 
another generation before this concept acquired 
full recognition and acceptance, its significance 
as a tool for ensuring freedom and democracy 
was already apparent. 
Maintaining Swiss Independence 
In 1495 the ruler of the Holy Roman 
Empire, Maxmilian I, attempted to reestablish 
his control over the cantons. Maxmilian joined 
the Swabian League, an alliance of southern 
German principalities organized to block Swiss 
expansion. Switzerland entered the conflict 
with an attack on Graubunden; with the 
Empire's defeat at the Battle of Dornach 
Maxmilian abandoned his plans, thus unoffi~ 
cially recognizing the independence of the 
Swiss Confederation in 1501. The Swabian War 
marked the final war for Swiss independence, 
and within two years the thirteen cantons 
joined in a Federal Union. 
Soon after the Swabian conflict 
Switzerland found itself involved in a struggl~ 
among France, Austria and Italy over control of 
the vital Po Valley. The Swiss had a vested inter-
est in the area, and wanted to prevent either 
France or Austria from closing in on them. In 
spite of a valiant effort, a dispirited and dis-
united Swiss force was decisively defeated on 
the fields of Marignano in September 1515. 
Under the terms of the peace treaty, Switzerland 
was permitted to retain most of her original ter-
ritory. According to Halbrook, "The defeat at 
Marignano prompted Switzerland to adopt a 
policy of permanent armed neutrality, with no 
imperialist or territorial ambitions." (Halbrook, 
p. 8) Linguistic and religious issues hampered 
any agreement regarding territory outside 
Swiss borders, leaving the Swiss with two 
options: either destroy the Confederation by 
involving themselves in the policies of Austria, 
France and Italy, or choose to remain indepen-
dent. Neutrality presented the most logical 
choice. As Luck explains, "Neutrality was 
emerging as a Swiss policy, and distinctions 
were drawn between wars of defense, which 
clearly were permissible to a neutral, and offen-
sive combat which was not consonant with neu-
trality." (Luck, p. 133) 
Neutrality as a Foreign Policy 
The benefits of neutrality became increas-
ingly evident during the destructive Thirty 
Years War. Violations of their territory by bel-
ligerents united Swiss Protestants and Catholics 
in their solid determination to resist such 
incursions. With the Treaty of Westphalia in 
1648, Switzerland's independence was official-
ly confirmed, thus ending 350 years of struggle 
with the Austrian Empire. However, solving the 
external threat to peace represented only a por-
tion of the problem. Internally, the loose con-
federation struggled for order. The thirteen 
Swiss cantons had neither a central govern-
ment nor a national army. Religious antago-
nisms persisted, and mistrust between rural and 
urban cantons was evident. Stephen Halbrook 
describes the Swiss condition as "a 
Confederation of disparate languages, ethnici-
ty and traditions; a decentralized political sys-
tem of the cantons, under which no leader from 
one canton was allowed to dominate the oth-
ers." (Halbrook, p. 8) Switzerland's political 
institutions found themselves ill prepared to 
meet the violent forces set loose by the French 
Revolution. The nation struggled to maintain 
neutrality in spite of existing pro- and anti-
French sentiments. However, her strategic 
position on the main Paris-Milan route prompt-
ed occupation by Napoleon. On March 5, 1798, 
the ancient confederation of thirteen cantons 
ceased to exist, as the French established the 
Helvetic Republic. Giving little consideration 
for the history and tradition of the Swiss, a sin-
gle constitution was imposed, and Switzerland 
became a vassal state. Internal disorder arose 
and steadily worsened, and by 1803 anarchy 
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prevailed. With the Mediation Act of 1803, 
Napoleon restored relative order and stability. 
The thirteen cantons were reestablished and six 
new ones were added to form the Helvetic 
Confederation. Mter the fall of Napoleon, The 
Congress of Vienna recognized the perpetual 
neutrality of the Swiss Confederation. 
Switzerland had learned a costly lesson at the 
hands of Napoleon. Stephen Halbrook explains: 
The period of Napoleonic domination 
was the last instance in which 
Switzerland's democracy and sover-
eignty were lost to a foreign invader. 
This occurred only because the Swiss 
themselves were disunited .... After 
the Napoleonic experience, the Swiss 
were determined never to allow an 
invasion again .... (Halbrook, p. 15) 
But determination alone would be insuffi-
cient in solving the existing problems. With the 
defeat of Napoleon, the Mediation Act fell apart 
and was replaced by a federal pact reestablish-
ing the Swiss Confederation of sovereign states, 
united for the singular purpose of common 
defense and the maintenance of internal order. 
Legal barriers separated the country, with each 
canton retaining its individual laws, currency, 
postal service, weights and measures, and army, 
thus making a unified foreign policy impossible. 
Civil liberties became nonexistent; suspicion and 
religious hostility surfaced. In 1845, these deep-
seated religious differences led to the formation 
of a separatist league of Roman Catholic cantons 
known as the Sonderbund. The Diet, represent-
ing the remaining cantons, demanded its disso-
lution in July 1847, recognizing that the 
Sonderbund was incompatible with regard to 
the restrictions of the Federal Pact. Civil War 
ensued for 25 days and resulted in victory for 
the confederation and, more significantly, in the 
drafting of a new constitution for Switzerland. 
Adopted by a seven-to-one vote, this document 
defined political organization as it exists today, 
as well as established a common foreign policy. 
Surprisingly, neutrality as an objective of the 
state was not written into the Federal 
Constitution. Neutrality was a means of pro-
tecting Swiss independence. While it was the 
responsibility of the Federal Council to super-
vise compliance with and observance of neu-
trality, it was not listed as a direct purpose of the 
Federal Constitution. The Constitution of 1848 
marked a major turning point in Swiss history, 
finally ending the internal strife and conflict that 
had to that point been a burdensome fact of life. 
Since its adoption, Switzerland has enjoyed a 
long absence of major internal crises with 
regard to either ethnic or religious differences. 
Switzerland had finally achieved the lasting 
internal peace she desired. 
Neutrality Defined and Tested 
Though already recognized, it was not 
until the Hague Convention of 1907 that neu-
trality as a policy was formally defined and 
established. The convention was called by Czar 
Nicholas II, and several protocols were adopted 
regarding the rights and duties of neutral pow-
ers. As set forth in The Hague Convention on 
Rights and Duties of Neutral States, neutrality 
required and/or permitted: 
• non-participation in war 
• self-defense 
• impartiality toward belligerents 
• no mercenaries for belligerents 
• the right to territorial integrity. 
Swiss neutrality would be severely tested 
with the outbreak of World War I on August 1, 
1914. On August 4, the Swiss Federal Council 
reaffirmed that Switzerland would maintain 
the strictest neutrality when confronted by bel-
ligerent states. As Halbrook explains: 
The concept of armed neutrality 
served Switzerland well in World 
War I as it had for centuries. 
Despite her location in the center 
of the continental European powers 
fighting the war, Switzerland suc-
cessfully preserved her strict neu-
trality and avoided becoming a bat-
tlefield. (Halbrook, p. 20) 
With the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, 
Switzerland's peaceful position was reaffirmed; 
the European nations ultimately recognized her 
policy of neutrality as a vital factor contribut-
ing to the balance and stability of the European 
continent. But then in May 1920, Switzerland 
made a decision that would have appeared to be 
in direct opposition to its stated policy of non-
involvement: she joined the League of Nations. 
The Council of the League recognized that 
Switzerland's permanent neutrality was justi-
fied in the interests of general peace and con-
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sistent with the League's principles. While not 
called upon to engage in military operations or 
to permit the transit of foreign troops, 
Switzerland would be bound to participate in 
economic sanctions taken by the League 
against covenant breaking nations. 
The disintegration of the League of Nations 
during the 1930s prompted Switzerland to 
relinquish the concept of differential neutrality, 
which permitted economic sanctions, and 
return to the position of integral neutrality, 
which forbade it. Fearing that world political 
turmoil would continue to escalate, Switzerland 
strengthened herself for the effects of possible 
conflict- militarily and psychologically. At the 
outbreak of World War II, a strong declaration 
of neutrality was issued by the Swiss Federal 
Council - a declaration backed by a strong 
army and air force. The nation was both deter-
mined and prepared to fight to preserve the 
peace and freedom it had worked so hard to 
achieve. Immediately following World War II, 
Switzerland survived as the only democratic 
state in central Europe despite a difficult geo-
graphical position on the continent. 
In 1986 the Swiss people overwhelmingly 
rejected membership in the United Nations by a 
three-to-one vote, fearing that the decision to 
join would necessitate relinquishing the politi-
cal self-control, and ultimately the neutrality, 
they had fought so hard to maintain. However, 
in 1991 Switzerland did side with the United 
Nations in the Persian Gulf War. Participation 
did not include military support, but Switzerland 
did agree to sanctions against Iraq, an incredi-
bly difficult policy decision for a traditionally 
neutral nation. As Hansjoerg Seiler explains: 
Iraq would never have considered 
Switzerland as a neutral under 
these circumstances. On the other 
hand, the coalition of international 
forces in Iraq could not view 
Switzerland as an ally they could 
count on. Therein lies the inevitable 
dilemma of the neutral state. 
(Seiler, p. 27) 
Through hundreds of years of world tur-
moil, Switzerland has managed to emerge rel-
atively unscathed - a tribute to its policy of 
neutrality. Looking inward at the political, eco-
nomic, and social success that has been 
achieved, it is obviously difficult for 
Switzerland to simply abandon a policy that 
has served it so well. 
Modifying Swiss Neutrality 
A close look at the history of Switzerland 
clearly indicates that neutrality as a policy has 
served the nation well, enabling it to remain 
whole and to prosper in spite of surrounding 
turmoil. Initially, neutrality was solely an 
emergency measure, a stop-gap device, prompt-
ed by the realization that external neutrality 
would serve to foster internal cohesion. 
However, in the course of history the usefulness 
of neutrality has firmly rooted itself deep in the 
Swiss conscience. For the people of 
Switzerland, the history and habit of neutrali-
ty runs so deep that is has become, for many, a 
national ideology. While the Swiss define their 
neutrality as self-determined, permanent and 
armed, in reality it has always been flexible in 
nature, adapting itself to the circumstances of 
the time and applying itself to serve the best 
interest of the nation. The question then 
remains as to whether neutrality is still in the 
best interest of Switzerland. 
Swiss neutrality remains historically moti-
vated; however, historic events of the 20th cen-
tury have significantly altered the nation's 
geopolitical surroundings such that the politi-
cal landscape, as well as the political order of 
Europe, no longer makes neutrality a necessi-
ty. In 1991 the Swiss Council conducted an in-
depth study examining the validity of neutrali-
ty, and concluded that it (neutrality) was still a 
useful tool for implementing the foreign and 
security policies of the Swiss confederation. 
However, only two years later in "The White 
Paper on Neutrality," the Federal Council rec-
ognized both the importance and feasibility of 
adapting Switzerland's neutrality policy to pres-
ent situations, particularly with regard to 
European integration. "The White Paper on 
Neutrality" clearly explained that Swiss neu-
trality and European integration need not be 
considered mutually exclusive as indicated by 
the following points: 
• The freely assumed obligation of 
neutrality should not prevent the 
country from taking whatever 
measures it deems necessary to 
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counter new types of threats 
against which it can protect itself 
only through international 
cooperation. 
• Participation in collective sanc-
tions imposed by the internation-
al community against a country 
that has broken the peace or vio-
lated international law is compat-
ible with neutrality. 
• Neutrality would be compatible 
with accession to the European 
Union in its present form (as of 
1993). ("The White Paper On 
Neutrality," 1993) 
Switzerland's integration into Europe and 
the European Union in particular is truly not 
an issue of constitutionality, but rather one of 
political and popular willingness. While Swiss 
opinion polls continue to reaffirm public oppo-
sition to a reinterpretation of neutrality, the 
Federal Council fully acknowledges that some 
degree of adaptation is necessary to insure 
Switzerland's position as a viable political and 
economic force. 
It is obvious that Switzerland may have 
been unique in a European theater marked by 
strife and turmoil, but that uniqueness has long 
since faded. The nations of Western and Central 
Europe have demonstrated their ability to coex-
ist peacefully and democratically, as well as to 
cooperate economically and socially. With the 
signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, a con-
tinent that had been shaken by conflict 
embarked on a future of friendly collaboration 
with the establishment of the European Union. 
Under the terms of the treaty, member states 
set forth the following objectives: 
1. To promote economic and social 
progress through the creation of an area 
without internal frontiers, through the 
strengthening of economic and social 
cohesion and through the establishment 
of economic and monetary union, ulti-
mately including a single currency. 
2. To assert its identity on the interna-
tional scene by implementing a com-
mon foreign and security policy and by 
the eventual framing of a common 
defense policy. 
3. To strengthen the protection of both 
the rights and interests of the people of 
the Member States mainly by estab-
lishing a citizenship of the European 
Union. 
4. To develop cooperation with regard to 
justice. 
5. To maintain in full the acquis commu-
nautaire (acquired communication/ 
document presently in force). 
In essence, Europe has achieved an 
admirable level of peace and security and is con-
tinuing on the path toward common prosperity 
based on cooperation and dialogue - a trend 
that appears destined to continue. As President 
of the Swiss Confederation Flavio Cotti explains: 
"Europe appears to be politically fundamental 
because it is the guarantee of peace, of collabo-
ration and of solidarity among its members. It 
is a network of progressive and intense inter-rela-
tionships... . And it is exactly for that reason that 
Switzerland's membership in the European 
Union represents the strategic objective of the 
Swiss Federal Government." (Cotti, p. 3) 
Switzerland and European 
Cooperation 
Switzerland has been consistent in 
attempting to establish closer ties with the 
nations of western Europe, supporting the 
process of European integration. The primary 
focus of cooperation has dealt with guarantee-
ing Swiss economic interests while maintain-
ing her neutral and political independence. 
Switzerland was the co-founder of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation in 
Europe (OECE) in 1948. As a founding mem-
ber of the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA) established in 1960, the Swiss support-
ed a broad-based free trade market in Europe. 
With the creation of the Swiss Integration 
Bureau in 1961 and membership in the 
European Council in May 1963, it became 
increasingly apparent that Switzerland had no 
intention of allowing neutrality to interfere 
with cooperation. Cooperation would be ana-
lyzed to determine if agreements violated 
Switzerland's policy of neutrality. The Swiss 
had, indeed, established a foundation for step-
by-step negotiations in the context of bilateral 
agreements. Once again, in 1972 Switzerland 
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remained consistent in her desire not to be 
excluded from European cooperation. The 
nation's prime economic goal -to secure free 
circulation of industrial goods within western 
Europe - resulted in the signing of the Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA) which afforded the 
Swiss the opportunity to negotiate additional 
trade agreements without relinquishing any 
degree of sovereignty. The arrangement 
allowed Switzerland to enjoy the economic ben-
efits of cooperation without jeopardizing neu-
trality, federalism and direct democracy. 
Finally, in 1992 Switzerland joined the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 
While the Swiss appear to be moving in 
the direction of economic integration, the 
preservation of absolute neutrality has served 
to hinder attempts at institutionalized political 
t ies with Europe. In 1986, fearing an irrevoca-
ble strain of the neutrality policy, the Swiss 
overwhelmingly rejected United Nations mem-
bership by a three-to-one margin. In December 
1992, Switzerland negotiated, but failed to rat-
ify, the European Economic Area (EEA) Treaty, 
which would have extended the European sin-
gle market. The rejection of the December 
1992 referendum clearly illustrated the cultur-
al rift that existed within Switzerland with 
regard to European integration. Chenaux-
Repond explains: 
French-speaking Swiss seem to 
approach Europe with more positive 
expectations and more self-confi-
dence than their German-speaking 
brethren. Despite their unquestion-
able political pride and sense for 
autonomy, they are partners in 
French culture without encumber-
ing complexes. In contrast, German-
speaking Swiss continue to suffer 
from at least a residual quest for 
demarcation from their German 
mother-culture - certainly a rem-
nant of their experiences with Nazi 
Germany. (Chenaux-Repond, p. 49) 
Switzerland has been cautious to pick and 
choose those aspects of European integration 
which were beneficial yet safe with regard to neu-
trality. However, in order to maintain a viable 
political and economic position on the European 
continent, cooperation needs to be extended, via 
participation in the European Union. 
Switzerland's Cooperation with the 
European Union 
The European Union is unquestionably a 
major force in the political and economic future 
of the world, and its impact on Swiss develop-
ment will become increasingly relevant in the 
years ahead. Recognizing the importance of the 
European integration process, the Swiss 
Federal Council acknowledges that assuming a 
position of non-participation could result in 
political isolation and economic discrimination 
as evidenced by the following: 
Switzerland will best defend its long-
term interests by participating fully 
and with equal rights in the 
European Integration Process. Only 
full membership of the EU will give 
Switzerland a say in the decision 
making process that is shaping the 
political, economic and cultural 
future of Europe. In spite of 
Switzerland remaining outside the 
EU, many of the Union's decisions 
affect Switzerland in much the same 
way as they affect the member states. 
("Integration Policy As Seen By The 
Confederation: Current Situation 
and Outlook") 
The growth of the European Union has 
significantly altered the balance of strength on 
the European continent. In a Europe without 
an EU, Switzerland would be considered a rel-
atively strong force- politically, economical-
ly and financially. However, if the EU is viewed 
as a single entity, the relative importance of 
Switzerland diminishes a great deal. As a mem-
ber of the EU, Switzerland could derive more 
strength by employing the joint power of the 
Union, thereby increasing its own influence 
with regard to the rest of the world. The 
Economist reported on November 28, 1992, 
that membership in the EU would "help liber-
ate the Swiss economy and enable Switzerland 
to come to terms with, and perhaps steer 
European independence." ("Switzerland and 
Europe: Time to Join the Others," p. 5) 
Switzerland has to date placed itself in a 
no-win situation with regard to integration into 
the EU. Rene Schwok explains that 
"Switzerland finds itself in a sort of satellite 
position, where it is attracted to the gravita-
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tional pull of the EU without being able to take 
part in it or exercise the slightest influence." 
(Schwok, p. 79) The Federal Council has taken 
all the necessary steps to insure that 
Switzerland adopts most of the standards, direc-
tives, and laws of the EU, in an attempt to place 
its own economic laws on an equal footing with 
those of the European Union. This indicates 
that the Swiss recognize that to do any less 
would negatively affect their ability to negoti-
ate with the European Union. By and large, 
Switzerland has subjected itself to the regula-
tions of the EU but has allowed itself no voice 
in the decision making process - all in the 
name of neutrality. 
Will entrance into the EU truly compro-
mise neutrality? Does a neutral state truly need 
to remain totally independent of other coun-
tries to maintain credibility? A close look at the 
Swiss economy indicates that this is certainly 
not the case. 1\vo-thirds of Swiss exports go to 
the EU, and three-fourths of Swiss imports 
come from it. Switzerland is also the second 
leading trade partner of the EU (after the United 
States) and the third leading supplier to the EU 
after the United States and Japan. It is also one 
of the main foreign investors in the EU, and 
Swiss companies provide work for more than 
1.1 million EU citizens. In reality, has not neu-
trality already been compromised? 
Sidestepping the EU: Bi-Lateral 
Agreements 
Recent history corroborates the obvious 
conclusion that the Swiss already recognize the 
importance of European participation and have 
taken certain steps to accomplish it. However, 
the steps come in the form of bilateral agree-
ments, which indicate that the Swiss are grav-
itating toward the EU while continuing to side-
step total commitment. 
The vote of the Swiss population against 
the December 1992 referendum which would 
have enabled the nation to join the European 
Economic Area was the initiating factor for the 
sector-by-sector bilateral agreements. The Swiss 
Federal Council perceives that the aforemen-
tioned agreements are necessary for two reasons: 
• Switzerland's non-participation in the 
Single European Market could have 
negative economic effects which could 
be alleviated by negotiating bilateral 
agreements. 
• The context of the bilateral agreements 
is more limited and will ensure that the 
wishes of the Swiss population will be 
respected. 
While the ultimate goal of the Swiss 
Federal Council is full accession to the EU, the 
Council wisely concedes that a "do nothing" or 
"a wait and see" policy is not an acceptable 
alternative. Therefore, formal negotiations to 
ratify the agreements begun in December 1994 
are concerned with seven major areas: 
1. Free Movements for Persons is a criti-
cal issue for the Swiss considering that, 
at over 19 percent, it has one of the 
highest proportions of foreigners in its 
population of any Western European 
country. Arriving at a solution which 
equally recognizes the requirements of 
the EU and Switzerland is a difficult 
task. The proposed solution would per-
mit Switzerland to control immigra-
tion for a period of twelve years, at 
which point total freedom of move-
ment would be complete. 
2. Overland Transport discussions will 
require Switzerland to develop an envi-
ronmentally friendly transport policy 
through the Alpine region. Included in 
the Swiss Constitution is the Article on 
the Protection of the Alps, which 
requires that goods being transported 
by road must be transferred to the rail-
way for transit through the Swiss Alps. 
According to the proposal by the 
Federal Council, this could be accom-
plished by imposing a heavy goods vehi-
cle tax proportionate to the number of 
kilometers traveled and by improving 
railway performance, making it com-
mensurate with transport by road stan-
dards. At a meeting in December 1998, 
Switzerland and the EU reached an 
agreement on the issues of overland 
transport. 
3. Air Transport negotiations are specifi-
cally aimed at providing Swiss airlines 
the same rights as their EU competi-
tors are permitted. As a result of their 
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present status, Swiss airlines suffer 
monetary losses estimated at Sfr200 
million per year, which is likely to dou-
ble in the near future. 
4. Public Sector Markets negotiations are 
aimed at applying the principles of 
non-discrimination and transparency 
to the markets of local authorities. 
Since Swiss industries are predomi-
nantly export-driven, agreements with-
in this area are critical. According to 
the Swiss Integration Office report, 
"Additional competition in the Swiss 
internal market, would stimulate the 
efficiency and competitiveness of Swiss 
bidders ... and eventually would result 
in more effective utilization of public 
funds." ("Bi-Lateral Agreements ... ) 
5. Technical Barriers to Trade negotia-
tions are vital, in that agreement would 
enable Swiss producers to have prod-
ucts tested and certified in their own 
countries with the help of a Swiss-
based laboratory recognized and 
accepted by the EEA. The financial 
benefit to these negotiations is obvious 
and noteworthy. According to EU esti-
mates, the partial dismantling of trade 
barriers will result in a savings of 2.45 
percent yearly, leading to a general 
reduction in product pricing. 
6. Field of Agriculture negotiations focus 
on a number of significant issues 
including the limitation of state inter-
vention and the increase of production. 
To a certain extent, agreement in this 
area constitutes a trade-off. Increased 
competition negatively affects the 
Swiss home market, while the new and 
increased opportunities provided by 
competition will be a benefit. 
7. Research negotiations, when conclud-
ed, will afford Swiss researchers com-
plete and full participation in and 
access to all EU research programs. 
While negotiations are ongoing, the com-
promises reached in some of the bilateral nego-
tiations in December 1998 indicate that, even 
in its present interpretation, neutrality need not 
stand in the path of integration. 
Reconciling Neutrality and 
Eurocompatibility 
A careful examination of the feasibility of 
reconciling neutrality and European accession 
indicates that the two are certainly not mutu-
ally exclusive. The government has slowly 
made certain revisions with regard to existing 
neutrality demands in order to guarantee that 
Switzerland not suffer political and economic 
isolation. While the sector-by-sector bilateral 
agreements are certainly a step in the right 
direction, the effects of total accession to the 
European Union are far greater and are within 
the realm of Switzerland's neutrality require-
ments. For example: 
• Accession of Switzerland to the 
European Union is completely compat-
ible with the Federal Constitution 
which was revised in 1977 specifically 
with an eye toward EU accession. 
• Accession would actually strengthen 
Swiss independence by affording it the 
opportunity to influence and shape the 
rules decisions that are of concern to 
the nation. 
• Accession would actually guarantee 
Switzerland a position of strength since 
the added influence of EU membership 
would make it difficult for any outside 
pressure to be exerted on the nation. 
• Accession would allow Switzerland to 
profit from trade agreements conclud-
ed by the EU on behalf of its members. 
• According to the Federal Council, 
accession would actually promote 
national cohesion as well as the influ-
ence of Switzerland outside of its own 
borders. 
• Accession would not interfere with the 
rights of initiative and referendum 
guaranteed to the Swiss people by the 
Federal Constitution. 
• The Federal Council believes that EU 
accession would in no way threaten the 
role of Parliament or of the cantons in 
the Swiss political system. 
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A Success Story That Has Reached 
Its Limits? 
The success story of Switzerland is 
unquestionably admirable. It is a story cher-
ished by the population, and rightfully so. It 
has become a story so cherished, however, that 
it is difficult to relinquish even when it is clear-
ly evident that it no longer serves the best inter-
est of the nation. For Switzerland, this history 
of success is synonymous with its history of 
neutrality; therefore, the Swiss mentality per-
ceives that relinquishing neutrality threatens 
the continued success of the country. In reali-
ty, just the opposite is true. 
Realistically speaking, at the present time 
neutrality is not a political, economic or social 
issue, but rather an issue of ideology, identity 
and national pride. It is so deeply imbedded in 
the fiber of Swiss history that it does, in a sense, 
define the nation as a whole. However, the rea-
sons that gave rise to neutrality are no longer 
valid. The positive role that neutrality played 
in the development of Switzerland has ended; 
it seems clear that if Switzerland is to contin-
ue on a path of productive development, change 
is necessary. That change necessitates at the 
very least a reinterpretation of the long-stand-
ing policy of neutrality. 
In the last half of the 20th century, the 
makeup of Europe has undergone positive 
changes, politically, economically and socially; 
Switzerland can no longer separate itself from 
the impact of these changes. The changes have 
produced a Europe that boasts of peace, secu-
rity, stability and cooperation, conditions once 
unique to Switzerland. This new, united 
Europe is a powerful force to be reckoned with 
and not ignored. 
Change in traditional policies is difficult; 
change on a small scale is obviously easier to 
accept than major change. Switzerland has 
taken a number of small steps with regard to 
cooperation, specifically in the form of bilater-
al agreements. Yet the Swiss continue to side-
step the final major step - European accession. 
In reality, neutrality is not an obstacle to Swiss-
European cooperation; the two are reconcilable. 
Switzerland is completely capable of 
assuming its place in the "new" Europe, while 
still maintaining most aspects of its neutrality. 
As Dieter Chenaux-Repond explains: 
There is no question at all that 
Switzerland possesses the overall 
potential for full membership in the 
European Union. Its economic 
strength, its infrastructure, its mul-
tilinguistic and multicultural com-
position could have made 
Switzerland an EU member par 
excellence years ago. The issues of 
military security and neutrality as 
the instruments to guarantee secu-
rity are no obstacle. (Chenaux-
Repond, p. 51) 
Only in the event that the European Union 
concludes a collective security agreement 
among its members would the question of neu-
trality need to be re-evaluated. As the 
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Integration Report of 1999 clearly states: 
EU accession would have no impact 
on the preservation of Swiss neu-
trality, as the examples of Finland 
and Austria prove. By staying neu-
tral, Switzerland would undertake 
when it joins the Union to participate 
in the creation of a comprehensive 
continental security system and 
would ultimately gain a security 
margin from that system. However, 
it could preserve its position in situ-
ations with a critical bearing on neu-
trality by exercising the constructive 
right of abstention. ("Bilateral 
Agreements ... ) 
The future of a progressive and productive 
Switzerland lies within the European Union and 
ultimately within the hands of the Swiss peo-
ple, who need to take the next step and say, Yes 
to Europe! (Swiss Integration Office) 
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